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Abstract
The incompatibility between the Pareto indi®erence criterion and a concern for
greater equality in living standards of heterogenous populations (see, amongst oth-
ers, Ebert, 1995, 1997, Ebert and Moyes, 2003 and Shorrocks, 1995) might come as
a surprise, since both principles are reconcilable when people di®er only in income
(homogenous population). We present two families of welfare rankings {(i) single
parameter extensions of the generalized Lorenz dominance rule and (ii) a subset of
Weymark's (1981) generalized Ginis{ and show how and why these rules resolve the
paradox.
JEL classi¯cation: D31, D63, I31.
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1 Motivation
In the literature on heterogenous welfare comparisons, there seems to be a con°ict be-
tween welfarism and a concern for greater equality in living standards (see amongst others
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1Ebert, 1995, 1997, Ebert and Moyes, 2003 and Shorrocks, 1995). Living standards are
indices which convert the income of people of di®erent type, say hearing blind versus see-
ing deaf, into welfare measures, assumed to be comparable across individuals. The cited
contributions claim that the welfarist Pareto indi®erence principle {which requires social
indi®erence between two situations in which all individuals reach the same living standard{
is incompatible with the between type Pigou-Dalton (btpd) transfer principle {preferring
mean-preserving income transfers which equalize living standards.
Following Shorrocks (1995), we will discuss the issue, in this note, in its simplest and most
pure setting: ranking income distributions amongst individuals, when those individuals
might di®er not only with respect to the income they obtain, but in other aspects too. The
essentials of the problem of making welfare comparisons among heterogenous populations
are safeguarded in the individual setting, without having to treat simultaneously the prob-
lem of converting distributions among households into distributions among individuals.
Moreover, the solutions we will propose can be adapted to tackle the household-individual
conversion problem too, as we will argue in section 3.
To motivate this point of view, we provide two examples which illustrate, for the generalized
Lorenz dominance (gld) ranking (Shorrocks, 1983) and in a purely individual framework,
the stated incompatibility between Pareto indi®erence and the between type Pigou-Dalton
principle, which underlies the di±culty of making welfare comparisons among heterogenous
populations.1 In those examples we consider the case of Eve and Mary; Eve has a weaker
metabolism than Mary and therefore she needs more food (and thus more income) to reach
the same level of calorie intake as Mary. We use ratio scale equivalent income functions to
convert monetary incomes into comparable welfare measures. More precisely, Eve obtains
only two third's of Mary's welfare level for the same amount of income.
In our ¯rst example, we consider the case where Eve has not only a weaker metabolism,
but also earns less income than Mary. Their nominal incomes are (6;18). Because of Eve's
defective metabolism, she will reach a welfare level of only 4 units, whereas Mary's income
is identical to her welfare and thus equals 18. Consider now a transfer of 6 income units
from Mary to Eve. After the transfer, nominal incomes are equal: (12;12). The transfer
also results in a more equal distribution of living standards (welfare levels): (8;12). The
situation is summarized in table 1 below. Notice that we designed the transfer such that,
ex post, Eve is still worse o® in terms of equivalent income (welfare).
Nevertheless, according to the gld ranking, applied to equivalent incomes, both distribu-
1 The same problem occurs for other sum-type welfarist rankings (see Ebert, 1997).
2tions cannot be compared, the reason being, that despite the more equal distribution of
living standards after transfer, the mean living standard, which was equal to 11 before
the transfer, has decreased to 10, while mean nominal income, per de¯nition, remained
constant and equals 12. More equality in living standards with a heterogenous popula-
tion might imply giving up e±ciency: weak persons are de¯ned to be non-e±cient welfare
producers.
Example 1: a between type Pigou-Dalton transfer
Situation before
type weak metabolism strong metabolism
income 6 18
equivalence scale 1.5 1






income transfer from welfare rich to welfare poor
which preserves rankings of equivalent incomes
Situation after
type weak metabolism strong metabolism
income 12 12
equivalence scale 1.5 1
equivalent income 8 12
Ebert (1997) suggests solving the problem by applying the gld criterion (or other welfarist
alternatives) to the equivalent income vector weighted by the equivalence scales. In the
present context, the weighted mean of equivalent incomes in both cases equals 48
5 and the
after transfer distribution (always) dominates the original one according to the weighted
gld-criterion.
In our second example, we consider the case where a surgery can cure Eve's defective
metabolism. However, the surgery costs 6 income units. After the surgery, Eve and Mary
both have an equally strong metabolism: they can attain the same level of welfare with
equal incomes. The situation is summarized in table 2 below.
The essential point now is that equivalent incomes before and after the surgery are the
same. Pareto indi®erence requires that the social welfare ordering is indi®erent between
both situations in such a case. Ebert's weighted gld criterion runs into problems now.
Indeed, average income, and thus weighted average welfare (or living standard) before the
3surgery is higher: the cost of the surgery was too high to warrant the cure of the defect.
Weighted gld prefers, in this case, a society with unequal type and income distributions,
over a more equal, but less a²uent, type and income distribution, even if the welfare levels
did not change at all. The standard (un-weighted) gld-criterion applied to equivalent
incomes, is indi®erent between both situations, as the Pareto indi®erence criterion requires.
Example 2: changing types by means of a surgery
Situation before
type strong metabolism weak metabolism
income 6 18
equivalence scale 1 1.5






by a surgery which costs
6 income units
Situation after
type strong metabolism strong metabolism
income 6 12
equivalence scale 1 1
equivalent income 6 12
Since Pareto indi®erence in homogenous societies (when people all are of the same type, and
welfare levels are in accordance with income) is compatible with any degree of inequality
aversion, the suggested con°ict might come as a surprise. In this note, we will show how
this apparent con°ict can be overcome. In the next section (section 2) we present two sets
of continuous welfare rankings: the r-extended gld rankings and families of what we will
call r-generalized Ginis. Both sets are de¯ned with the aid of a parameter r 2 R+. The
r-extended gld rankings are de¯ned exclusively by this parameter (there is one ranking for
each choice of r). There exists, on the other hand, for each r, a family of r-generalized Ginis,
and each such family forms a subset of Weymark's (1981) generalized Ginis. Both sets of
rules are linked: for any given r, the r-extended gld ranking is equivalent with unanimity
among the members of the associated family of r-generalized Ginis. In a companion paper
(Cap¶ eau and Ooghe, 2004), we characterize these rankings.
When r equals zero, we obtain either the \standard" gld quasi-ordering or the complete
set of generalized Ginis; when r approaches in¯nity, we can come, in both cases, arbitrarily
4close to the leximin rule, which is known to overcome the con°ict between Pareto and
inequality aversion, but binds in on continuity (cf. Ebert and Moyes, 2003). Suitably
adapting the r-parameter provides continuous welfare rankings which satisfy both Pareto
indi®erence and the between type Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. The con°ict is due
to other, background properties which the cited contributions impose silently on welfare
rankings.
In section 3 we return to examples 1 and 2 and illustrate how the rules can be applied to
the problems advanced in those examples. We show how and why these rules solve the
paradoxical incompatibility between welfarism and a concern for greater equality. Finally,
we indicate how the rules can cope with di®erences in household composition as a source
of heterogeneity. However, the con°ict between a concern for greater equality and e±-
ciency seems to reappear when we want to be able to compare heterogenous populations
of di®erent size. We show in section 4 that none of the rules we proposed can combine a
concern for e±ciency and inequality aversion with satisfying replication invariance. But
the assumption that replicating a society does not a®ect overall welfare, despite its com-
mon acceptance in the literature on welfare measurement, presupposes an answer to some
deep and fundamental questions in population ethics: is a society with more people of the
same type as those already existing really to be considered equally good as the present one,
or is it better or worse? And these questions are, we feel, even more di±cult to answer,
when people are heterogenous. We therefore consider the reconcilability of e±ciency and
inequality aversion with less demanding, and in our view, less controversial, aggregation
axioms, and get some positive results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Two families of welfare rankings
In the present section, we introduce a set of rankings2 of distributions of outcomes, without
specifying a priori which is the outcome of interest we will look at: in the terminology of the
preceding section, it could be income, equivalent income or any other well-being measure.
As such, our rules might therefore be applicable to classical welfare problems, trying to rank
income distributions among homogenous populations. Such a distribution of interest will
be denoted by a vector u = (u1;:::;un) 2 Rn. So, depending on the context, ui might be
2 A ranking, say R, is a re°exive and transitive binary relation on a set X, and will also be called a
quasi-ordering. Re°exivity means: 8 x 2 X : xRx. Transitivity holds when 8x;y;z 2 X : if xRy and yRz
then xRz. If the ranking is moreover complete (8 x;y 2 X : either xRy or yRx), we say it is an ordering.
5the income or the living standard (equivalent income) of an individual i 2 N = f1;:::;ng.
Since ui does not exclusively mean income, but can also refer to welfare, we allow for
negative entries in u. In the present text, the welfare level attained by a person's income,
given her type, is used as a synonym for equivalent income or living standard. Therefore,
if u denotes living standards, the welfare ranking is said to be welfarist. We consider
a population of individuals with ¯xed size n. Ranking heterogenous populations with
di®erent size and welfare, will be discussed in section 4.
For any u;v 2 Rn, the notation uRv means that distribution u is weakly preferred to
distribution v according to the ranking R. Associated with a weak preference relation R,
there is:
the strict preference relation, denoted by uPv, and de¯ned as: uRv and not vRu;
the indi®erence relation, denoted by uIv, de¯ned as: uRv and vRu.
All the rankings presented here satisfy anonymity: any permutation of a distribution u is
considered to be equally good as that distribution. Anonymity allows to focus attention
on the domain of ordered distributions, denoted by the set D ´ fu 2 Rn ju1 · ::: · ung,
in the sequel.





k¡i (ui ¡ vi) ¸ 0 for all k 2 N;
for all u;v 2 D.
Increasing r, increases the discriminatory power of this rule, i.e. the rule is able to rank
more distributions. Formally, this statement means:
Proposition 1 For all q;r 2 R+ such that q ¸ r:
(a) I(r) µ I(q)
(b) P(r) µ P(q).
Proof: see appendix.
In order to de¯ne the second collection of rankings, we introduce a set of positive, non-
decreasing, and normalized weight vectors W ´ fw 2 Rn jw1 ¸ ::: ¸ wn = 1g.
6De¯nition 2 Given any r 2 R+ and a weight vector w 2 W, an r-generalized Gini order-





n¡i wi (ui ¡ yi) ¸ 0;
for all u;v 2 D.
We will denote the family of r-generalized Ginis by G (r) ´ fR(r;w)jw 2 Wg. It is
the subset of all generalized Ginis for which the relative weight of two consecutive rank
positions is at least 1 + r.
Increasing r decreases the size of the family of r-generalized Ginis. More precisely:
Proposition 2 For all q;r 2 R+, such that q ¸ r: G (q) µ G (r).
Proof: see appendix.
When r = 0, the r-extended gld quasi-ordering corresponds with the standard gld quasi-
ordering, while the r generalized Ginis then correspond with the whole set of Weymark's (1981)
generalized Ginis. When r approaches 1, we can obtain in both cases the leximin order-
ing.3
The next proposition provides a link between both sets of rankings: it shows that the
r-extended gld quasi-ordering is equivalent with unanimity among the members of the
family of the corresponding r-generalized Gini orderings. Formally:





All the rankings, presented here, satisfy the following properties.
Continuity:
For any sequence of distributions (um)m2N0, if there exists an M 2 N0 such that for
some v 2 Rn: umRv for all m ¸ M then lim
m!1
um ´ u¤Rv; or, alternatively, if vRum
for all m ¸ M then vRu¤.
Strong Pareto (sp).
For all u;v 2 Rn: if u ¸ v, then uRv; if, in addition, u 6= v, then uPv.
3As there are di®erent possibilities to take the limit of a sequence of rankings, other limiting cases
might be obtained, such as the maximin rule (see Hammond, 1975).
7We introduce a set of new equality preference axioms, one for each scalar r ¸ 0.
r-extended Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (pd (r)).
For all u;v 2 Rn, such that for some i;j 2 N, (i) uk = vk, for all k 6= i;j, (ii) vi <
ui · uj < vj, and (iii)
vj¡uj
ui¡vi = 1 + r, it follows that uRv.
For any r ¸ 0, the r-gld ranking and all members of the r-Gini family G(r), satisfy the
corresponding pd(r)-principle.
The pd(r)-principles are modi¯cations of the standard Pigou-Dalton transfer principle.
They state that an equalizing transfer between two individuals {which does not change
their relative positions{ does not lower social welfare, whenever the loss to the donor
(vj ¡uj) is exactly equal to 1+r times the gains of the receiver (ui¡vi). For later use, we
call a transfer which satis¯es conditions (i)-(iii) in the de¯nition of the r-extended Pigou
Dalton transfer principle a pd(r)-transfer. Under the domain restriction D, associated with
anonymity, it might occur that the after transfer vector u does not belong any more to D.
By a slight abuse of notation, and without loss of generality, we will always read u to be
the after transfer rank-reordered vector belonging to D.
Choosing r = 0, leads to the standard Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. Furthermore, if R
satis¯es the strong Pareto principle, then increasing r increases the strength of the transfer
principle, i.e., pd(r) ) pd(q), for all q in [0;r]. This can be seen as follows: assume
that we impose pd(r), and assume that u is obtained from v via a pd(q)-transfer of size
± > 0, for q · r such that u = (v1;:::;vi¡1;vi +±;vi+1;:::;vj¡1;vj ¡(1+q)±;vj+1;:::;vn)
. Then construct u0 from v, by means of a pd(r)-transfer of size ² = ±
1+q
1+r · ±. Then
u0
j = vj ¡ (1 + r)±
1+q
1+r = uj and u0
i = vi + ±
1+q
1+r · ui = vi + ±. Hence, by sp, uRu0 and by
pd(r), u0Rv. So, by transitivity of R, we obtain uRv.
Thus, under the strong Pareto principle, pd(r) is a strengthening of the standard Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle. Then, we can adopt the convention that pd(1) means that pd(r)
holds for all r ¸ 0. If so, we obtain (a slightly stronger version of) the Hammond equity
principle.4
3 Inequality aversion and e±ciency reconciled again
The r-extended Pigou-Dalton transfer principle is at the heart of our new rules. It is also
easy to understand why it allows welfarist rules to satisfy the btpd transfer principle (a
4Hammond's (1976) equity principle states that uRv if 9 i;j 2 N such that (i) uk = vk, for all k 6= i;j,
(ii) vi < ui < uj < vj. Contrary to Hammond's equity principle, our principle also applies when ui = uj.
8formal de¯nition of that principle is provided below). Recall example 1: as Mary is a more
e±cient equivalent income generator than Eve, any income transfer from Mary to Eve
leads to a loss in total equivalent income. Indeed, as we go from a(n individual equivalent
income) distribution (4;18) to (8;12), 2 equivalent income units are lost. But such a leak
during the transfer is precisely what is allowed for by the r-extended Pigou-Dalton transfer
principle: it su±ces to choose r = 1
2 (or larger), to see that (8;12) can be derived from





-transfer. We will clarify below how to choose r in order to guarantee
satisfaction of the btpd-transfer principle.
We turn now to the application of the rules presented in the previous section to the prob-
lem of welfare comparisons among heterogenous populations as de¯ned in section 1. In-
dividuals in such a setting do not only di®er with respect to the level of income they
obtain, say yi, but also with respect to other characteristics. People who are identical in
all (relevant) aspects, except possibly for the level of income they obtain, are said to be
of the same type, say µi = µj, where µi;µj 2 £, the set of all possible types. Welfare
economics for homogenous populations is concerned with ranking income vectors: in the
terminology of the previous section this means u = (y1;:::;yi;:::;yn). Comparing het-
erogenous populations amounts to looking for suitable rankings of the vectors (y;µ) ´
((y1;µ1);:::;(yi;µi);:::;(yn;µn)). We limit ourselves to a setting where this problem can
be converted into one of ranking equivalent incomes or welfare levels. More speci¯cally,
we de¯ne equivalent incomes by means of ratio equivalence scales: the equivalent income










where m(µi) is type µi's equivalence scale. In the language of the previous section, the
vectors we now rank are those equivalent income vectors: u = e(y;µ). It is therefore
natural to limit the domain of the vectors u to the non-negative part of the n-dimensional
real vector space, Rn
+, as we will do from now on.
In this context, the between type Pigou-Dalton principle and Pareto indi®erence are prop-
erties of a ranking, say R, de¯ned on income and type distributions belonging to Rn
+ ££n.
Pareto indi®erence (pi).
For all (y;µ);(x;³) 2 Rn
+ £ £n: if e(y;µ) = e(x;³) then (y;µ)I(x;³).
Between type Pigou-Dalton principle (btpd).
For all x;y 2 Rn
+ and any µ 2 £n: if (i) xk = yk, for all k 6= i;j, (ii) ei(y;µ) <
ei(x;µ) · ej(x;µ) < ej(y;µ), and (iii) xi ¡ yi = yj ¡ xj, then (x;µ)R(y;µ).
We show ¯rst how it is possible to reconcile the Pareto indi®erence principle and the
9btpd transfer principle by means of the rules introduced in the previous section. Let
us return to the motivating examples introduced in section 1. If we choose r su±ciently
high, for example r ¸ 1=2, and apply the r-extended gld quasi-ordering to the individual
equivalent income vectors of example 1 and 2, then both the btpd transfer principle
(example 1) as well as the Pareto indi®erence principle (example 2) are satis¯ed.
Proposition 4 The r-extended gld quasi-ordering (resp. any member of the r-generalized
Gini orderings) applied to individual equivalent income distributions, allows to reconcile the










Why then is it possible to reconcile both principles, despite the claim in the literature that
these principles are incompatible? The weights in the proposed rankings are power terms
of 1 + r, where the power depends on the (individual) equivalent income position (rank).
Rank order weights are however excluded in (i) Ebert (1997), who imposes separability,
(ii) Ebert and Moyes (2003), where the weights can only depend on the reference type
and the own type, and (iii) Shorrocks (1995), who imposes di®erentiability of the welfare
ranking. It is fair to mention that Shorrocks actually describes a two-person r-generalized
Gini ordering as a possible solution (when relaxing di®erentiability), but he discards this
possibility for practical purposes, without further explanation.
Equivalence scales are mostly applied when individuals di®er (only) with respect to the
size of the household to which they belong. For practical applications, this context may
raise some complications if only household incomes are observed or if only transfers be-
tween household incomes are available to the government. Indeed, in that case we are
asked to judge, for example transfers from households with few happy members to large
scale families, populated however by non-e±cient welfare producers. These problems are
reminiscent of the deep ethical problems when judging populations of variable size, to
which we return in the next section. For a ¯xed size population, many of the prob-
lems can however be circumvented by introducing the concept of a per capita equivalence
scale. Given a set of individuals, N, the set of partitions of N (a partition of N is a
set of nonempty and non-overlapping subsets of N, the union of which equals N), de-
noted by H(N), constitutes the set of possible household constellations for this society. A
household constellation is a description of the way individuals decide to join together in
10households; these are, basically, income pooling units. For a given household constellation,
say h 2 H(N), let H(h) = f1;2;:::;h;:::g be the index set for the households in that
constellation to which individuals belong. Individuals can then be indexed by the corre-
spondence i : H(h) ! N, such that i 2 i(h) means that individual i belongs to household
h. Equivalence scales are now associated with a household h and provide a measure to
convert household income, into the nominal income level needed by a reference household
(usually a single) to obtain the same welfare level as the members of that household. All
non-income information concerning the household can be recollected into the household
type, which will be denoted by 'h 2 ©, where © is the set of all possible household types.
The equivalence scale is henceforth dependent on the household's type information (and
the reference type): m('h).5 The size of a household equals the number of its members:
s('h) = ji(h)j. The per capita equivalence scale equals:
m('h)
s('h) . It gives a measure of the
extent to which there are (dis)economies of scale of living in larger units. An (income,type)-
















follow the standard assumption, in this literature, that individual welfare or living stan-
dards within a household are equally distributed: ei(y;') =
yh
m('h) for all i 2 i(h).6 A
reformulation of the Pareto indi®erence criterion and the between type Pigou-Dalton prin-
ciple in this context is straightforward. Notice, however, that the between type Pigou
Dalton principle considers a monetary transfer between households, such that the living
standard of all its members is a®ected. This is embodied in the notation: (i) xg = yg,
for all g 2 H(h) : g 6= h;h0, (ii) ei(y;') < ei(x;') · ej(x;') < ej(y;') for all
i 2 i(h); j 2 i(h0), and (iii) xh ¡ yh = yh0 ¡ xh0. We get the following, slightly weaker,
adjoint result to proposition 4:
Corollary to proposition 4 The r-extended gld quasi-ordering (resp. any member of the
r-generalized Gini orderings) applied to individual equivalent income distributions, allows










5By a slight abuse of notation, we continue to denote equivalence scale functions by m.
6Alternatively, it could be assumed that nominal household income is equally distributed and equiv-
alence scale depend solely on individual type information, converting per capita incomes into individual
living standards (as f.e. in Shorrocks, 1995).
114 Variable population size
Finally, we turn to applications of the presented rules to the comparison of heterogenous
populations of variable size. We therefore have to extend the domain of the rules to
the set R ´
S
n2N0
Rn. The r-generalized Ginis are readily extended to this domain by
selecting for each population size n 2 N0, a weight vector of length n, say wn 2 Wn where
Wn ´ fwn 2 Rn jw1;n ¸ ::: ¸ wi;n ¸ ::: ¸ wn;n = 1g.
For making comparisons of vectors of di®erent size, we will use replications of a vector u.




@u1;:::;u1 | {z }
m times




The variable population size equivalent of the r-extended gld ranking is de¯ned as follows:






(1 + r)m¢n ¡ 1
(¸m (u)i ¡ ¸n (v)i) ¸ 0 for all k · m ¢ n;
where Dn, with n 2 N0, is the set of rank re-ordered real vectors of length n.
A problem occurs if we require the ranking to be replication invariant, which means that
social welfare must not change when replicating the distribution a number of times.
Replication invariance (ri)
For all n 2 N0, for all u 2 Rn, for all m 2 N0: uI¸m (u).
The next proposition states that replication invariance reinforces the r-extended Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle:
Proposition 5 For all r > 0, sp, pd(r) and ri imply pd(q) for all q 2 R+.
Proof: see appendix.
Recall that pd(r) for all r 2 R+ corresponds with Hammond equity. As a consequence of
the last proposition, given r > 0, there is only one ordering satisfying sp, pd(r) and ri: it
is the leximin rule applied to (possibly replicated) distributions of equal length. Requiring
in addition continuity, would lead to an impossibility result.
12This result must not come as a surprise. The combination of the Pareto criterion with the
pd(r)-principle leads to a speci¯c trade-o® between mean equivalent income and a more
equal distribution of living standards: the amount of mean equivalent income one wants to
give up increases with the number of people in society, even if inequality does not change.
Replication invariance goes against this principle, but is not uncontroversial per se: it
takes a speci¯c stance in the discussion between average and total sum utilitarians (opting
resolutely for the former).
Admittedly, it is even impossible for an anonymous, complete and continuous welfare
ranking which satis¯es the pd(r) principle and the strong Pareto criterion, to satisfy si-
multaneously the weaker population principle:
Population principle (pp)
For all n 2 N0, for all u;v 2 Rn, for all m 2 N0: uIv if and only if ¸m (u)I¸m (v).
The latter criterion does not impose a speci¯c choice between average and total sum utili-
tarianism, but poses the questions involved in comparing societies with di®erent population
size in those terms.
Corollary to proposition 5 For any r > 0, there is no member of the r-generalized
Ginis, G(r), which satis¯es pp.
Proof: see appendix.
There are other consistency requirements between rankings of distributions among popu-
lations of di®erent size, such as the restricted aggregation principles (see Ebert, 1988). Let
uk be a distribution in a population of size k: uk 2 Rk. For any k 2 N0 : k ¸ 2, and any
vector uk 2 Rk, de¯ne the equally distributed equivalent » (uk) to be the outcome which,
if it were obtained by all individuals in society, would yield the same welfare as the stated
distribution uk: ¸k (» (uk))Iuk.
Restricted aggregation from above (raa)
For all n 2 N0 : n ¸ 3, for all u 2 Rn, for all k : 0 · k · n:
uI (u1;:::;uk;¸n¡k (» (uk+1;:::;un))):
The latter vector should be read as ¸n (» (u)) if k = 0.
Restricted aggregation from below (rab)
For all n 2 N0 : n ¸ 3, for all u 2 Rn, for all k : 1 · k · n:
uI (¸k (» (u1;u2;:::;uk));uk+1;:::;un):
13The latter vector should be read as ¸n (» (u)) if k = n.
The following result is obtained:
Proposition 6 For any r > 0, the r-generalized Ginis such that, for each n 2 N0 : n ¸ 3,




In this note we showed how it is possible to circumvent the claimed incompatibility be-
tween e±ciency (Pareto indi®erence) and inequality aversion (between type Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle) when comparing heterogenous individuals. The intuition for our result
is straightforward: the proposed r-extended gld quasi-ordering can be interpreted as an
extension of the standard gld quasi-ordering. While the latter can only approve classi-
cal Pigou-Dalton transfers, the former also approves some transfers which might cause a
decrease in average equivalent income. In this sense, we say that the r-extended gld quasi-
ordering is more inequality averse than its ordinary counterpart. Similarly, for each member
of the class of r-generalized Ginis, the rate of substitution between two consecutive equiv-
alent income positions is at least 1 + r. By using rank dependent weights, we are able
to de¯ne the minimal amount of inequality aversion a welfare ranking should exhibit in
order to meet the between type Pigou-Dalton criterion, independent of the given equivalent
income distribution and the size of transfer, while at the same retaining the anonymity
criterion (abandoned by Ebert, 1997). In this way, we could determine a set of su±ciently
inequality averse welfare rankings, without having to violate the Pareto criterion.
14Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
(a) follows from the fact that for all r 2 R+ and all u;v 2 D: uI(r)v if and only if u = v
(indi®erence sets associated with R(r) de¯ned on D, are singletons).
To prove (b), suppose uP (r)v holds, for some r 2 R+ and for some u;v 2 D. Abbreviate








k¡i ¢i, for all k 2 N; (1)
which indeed leads to uP (q)v, because uP (r)v implies that the right hand-side summation is
non-negative for all k (and positive for at least one k).
Proof by induction. First, (1) is obvious for k = 1. Secondly, suppose (1) holds for some 1 · k < n




(k+1)¡i ¢i = (1 + q)
| {z }
A1




k¡i ¢i + ¢k+1.
Given (®) q ¸ r ¸ 0, (¯) the induction hypothesis, and (°) uP (r)v we have
A1 = 1 + q
(®)
¸ 1 + r |{z }
A2
(®)















The desired result follows, because









Proof of proposition 2
Consider r;q 2 R+ with q ¸ r. We show that for each rule R(q;w) in G (q) there exists a weight
vector w0 2 W such that R(q;w) = R(r;w0) 2 G (r). Abbreviate ¢i = ui ¡ vi for all i 2 N;
R(q;w) is de¯ned as follows:





n¡i wi¢i ¸ 0.





, which belongs to W; this leads to the desired
result.
15Proof of proposition 3
Actually, the proposition says:
8 r 2 R+;8 u;v 2 D :
uR(r)v , uR(r;w)v 8 w 2 W:
We show ¯rst that all orderings in G (r) are consistent with the r-extended gld quasi-ordering
(su±ciency): for all r 2 R+ and for all u;v 2 D: uR(r)v implies uR(r;w)v for all w 2 W. Let


















n¡1¡i ¢i + ®n¢n ¸ 0; 8®n¡1 ¸ ®n
(1 + r)

































¢i ¸ 0;8®n¡2;®n¡1 ¸ ®n
(1 + r)
3 ®n¡2®n¡1 | {z }
:::





























n¡i wi¢i ¸ 0; for all w 2 W, as required.
Conversely, for all r 2 R+ and for all u;v 2 D: uR(r;w)v for all w 2 W implies uR(r)v. We
prove this statement by contradiction. Suppose thus that there exists an r 2 R+ and u;v 2 D
such that uR(r;w)v for all w 2 W, but not uR(r)v, i.e., there must exist a k 2 N such that
Pk
i=1 (1 + r)
k¡i ¢i < 0. Choose a family of weight vectors
W(k) = fw 2 Wjw1 = ::: = wk ¸ wk+1 = ::: = wn = 1g.












n¡i ¢i ¸ 0, for all w1 ¸ 1












n¡i ¢i ¸ 0, for all w1 ¸ 1;
which is false (as w1 can be chosen arbitrarily high to make the expression strictly negative).
Proof of proposition 4
Notice that Pareto indi®erence is satis¯ed, since the proposed quasi-orderings are de¯ned on
the domain of distributions of equivalent incomes. We show that the btpd transfer principle










Due to proposition 3, the result then also holds for the r-extended gld quasi-ordering.
First, consider a \worst" case scenario (\worst" in terms of a decrease in total equivalent income)
of transferring money between two persons: the decrease in total equivalent income is largest, if
we transfer an amount of income ² > 0 from a household with the minimal per-capita equivalence
scale, denoted type µ = argmin
µ2£
fm(µ)g to a household with the maximal per-capita equivalence
scale (and a lower equivalent income), denoted type µ = argmax
µ2£
fm(µ)g. Assume that both
persons occupy adjacent rank positions. According to an r-generalized Gini-ordering, such a









Secondly, any other transfer might, in general, change the equivalent income positions of indi-
viduals. But it su±ces to notice that (i) each transfer can be decomposed into a ¯nite number
of welfare improving transfers between two persons, which do not change the equivalent income
positions in the distribution, and (ii) whenever two persons have the same equivalent income,
(equivalent income) positions can be attributed arbitrarily (without changing total welfare). This
completes the proof.
17Proof of the corollary to proposition 4
The same logic as for the previous proof is followed. So, Pareto indi®erence is satis¯ed, since
the proposed quasi-orderings are de¯ned on the domain of distributions of individual equivalent
incomes. We show that the btpd transfer principle is satis¯ed by an r-generalized Gini ordering,









Due to proposition 3, the result then also holds for the r-extended gld quasi-ordering.
First, consider the \worst" (\worst" in terms of a decrease in total equivalent income) possible
transfer of money between two households, such that the number of households with an equivalent
income strictly in between both households remains ¯xed, say a ¸ 0. The decrease in total
equivalent income is largest, if we transfer an amount of income ² > 0 from a household with the
minimal per-capita equivalence scale, denoted type ' = argmin
'2©
fm(')=s(')g to a household
with the maximal per-capita equivalence scale (and a lower equivalent income), denoted type
' = argmax
'2©
fm(')=s(')g. According to an r-generalized Gini-ordering, such a transfer will not















































Rearranging terms leads to the desired result.
Secondly, for transfers that change the equivalent income positions of households, similar remarks
apply as for the proof of proposition 4.
Proof of proposition 5
We ¯rst prove the following lemma:
18Lemma 1 For any n 2 N0, with n ¸ 2, for any r 2 R++, for any a 2 R and for all " > 0, consider
the following sequence of pd(r)-transfers, starting from a vector v1 =
0




1. Construct v2 from v1 by means of a pd(r)-transfer from individual (at position) 2 to 1, such
that the incomes of 1 and 2 are equal.
2. Construct v3 from y2 by means of pd(r)-transfers from 3 to 2 and from 3 to 1, such that the
incomes of 1,2, and 3 are equal.
:::
n¡1: Construct vn from vn¡1 by means of pd(r)-transfers from n to all other individuals n¡
1;:::;1, such that all incomes are equal.
Following this procedure, we will end up with a distribution vn =
0









Obviously, vnRv1 holds for any (quasi-)ordering satisfying pd(r).
Proof by induction. For n = 2 this result is obvious. Starting from v1 = (a ¡ (1 + r)";a) the
pd(r)-transfer ± which equalizes incomes is the one which satis¯es
a ¡ (1 + r)" + ± = a ¡ (1 + r)±;
and thus ± =
(1+r)"
1+(1+r). We end up with v2 = (b;b) with
b = a ¡ (1 + r)" + ± = a ¡ (1 + r)" +
(1 + r)"
1 + (1 + r)
= a ¡ (1 + r)"
µ
1 + r
1 + (1 + r)
¶
:
Suppose it holds for n (induction hypothesis); we show that it also holds for n + 1. Start with
a vector v1 =
0
@a ¡ (1 + r)";a;:::;a | {z }
n times
1
A. As it holds for n, we obtain after n ¡ 1 steps a vector
vn =
0









1 + (1 + r)i
:
19In the ¯nal step we perform pd(r)-transfers from n+1 to all other individuals such that incomes
become equal. This transfer ± can be calculated as:











(1 + (1 + r)n)
:
We end up with vn+1 =
0















(1 + (1 + r)n)








1 + (1 + r)n
¶




1 + (1 + r)i
, as required.
¥
We prove now that pd(r) and ri imply pd(t(m)), for all m 2 N0 with m ¸ 2, and









1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)
;
and that lim
m!1t(m) = 1 whenever r > 0. This will complete our proof for the following reason.
Recall that, when sp holds, pd(t) ) pd(q), for all q in [0;t]. As m can be chosen arbitrarily large
and given that lim
m!1t(m) = 1, we obtain the desired result, i.e., pd(q) must hold for all q 2 R+.
First, we show that the limit lim
m!1
t(m) diverges. Notice that the sequence with elements





1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)
¶
(4)
diverges if the series















1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)
¶
; (5)
20diverges. We prove that the series composed by the sequence faig
1






diverges for r > 0. As all ai > 0, for r > 0, it then must march o® to in¯nity. As ln(1 + x) ¸ x¡ x2
2















2r(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)) ¡ r2
2(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1))
2






2r(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)) ¡ r2
2(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1))
2
2(1 + (1 + r)i)
2









2r(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)) ¡ r2
2(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1))
2
2(1 + (1 + r)i)
2





The de Morgan and Bertrand test tells us that the series diverges, whenever lim
i!1






2r(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1)) ¡ r2
2(1 + (1 + r)(i ¡ 1))
2
2(1 + (1 + r)i)
2










¡2r + r2 + i + 2ri2 + i2 ¡ 2ri + r2i2 ¡ 3r2i
i(i + ri ¡ r)









¡2r + r2 + i + 2ri2 + i2 ¡ 2ri + r2i2 ¡ 3r2i
¢
(i + ri ¡ r)













= 0 (for r > 0).
Secondly, pd(r) and ri imply pd(t(m)), for all m 2 N0 with m ¸ 2. To prove this result, consider
u;v 2 D, m 2 N0, with m ¸ 2, and i;j 2 N with (i) uk = vk, for all k 6= i;j, (ii) vi < ui · uj < vj,
and (iii)
vj¡uj




1+(1+r)i. Using pd(r) and ri, we prove that uRv holds. De¯ne
v0 = ¸m (v) =
0
B B



















Let " = ui ¡ vi > 0. Consider the following sequence of pd(r) transfers starting from v0:
1. Choose v1
k = v0
k, for all k 6= m(i ¡ 1) + 1;m(j ¡ 1) + 1, v1
m(i¡1)+1 = v0
m(i¡1)+1 + " = ui and
v1
m(j¡1)+1 = v0
m(j¡1)+1 ¡ (1 + r)". Via pd(r), we have v1Rv0.
212. Choose v2
k = v1



































k, for all k 6= m(i ¡ 1) + 2;m(j ¡ 1) + 1, v3
m(i¡1)+2 = v2
m(i¡1)+2 + " = ui and
v3
m(j¡1)+1 = v2
m(j¡1)+1 ¡ (1 + r)". Via pd(r), we have v3Rv2.
4. Choose v4
k = v3




























1 + (1 + r)i




1 + (1 + r)i
;
and v4Rv3.
5. Proceeding this way, we end up with
v2m =
0
@u1;:::;u1 | {z }
m times
;:::;vi + ";:::;vi + " | {z }
m times
;:::;bm;:::;bm | {z }
m times




and v2mRy0. Applying ri to both sides gives:
(u1;:::;ui¡1;vi + ";ui+1;:::;uj¡1;bm;uj+1;:::;un)Rv:
22Since








we obtain uRv, as required.
Proof of the corollary to proposition 5
For any r > 0, for any n 2 N0 and any distribution u 2 Dn, the equally distributed equivalent of
u, say »(u) for the ordering R(r;wn), with wn =
0
@1;:::;1 | {z }
n times
1





(1 + r)n ¡ 1
ui:









(1 + r)m¢n¡(i¡1)m ¡ (1 + r)m¢(n¡i)
(1 + r)m¢n ¡ 1
ui;
the equally distributed equivalent for the ordering R(r;1m¢n).










Notice that »wn(u) ¸ »(u) for all u 2 Dn.
pp implies that for some wn 2 Wn, it holds that:













(1 + r)m¢n¡(i¡1)m ¡ (1 + r)m¢(n¡i)
(1 + r)m¢n ¡ 1
ui;
and this should hold for all u 2 Dn.
The limit of the rhs of this expression for m ! 1 converges to u1. Consequently, it is impossible
to ¯nd a weight vector in the domain Wn which could guarantee the last inequality.
23Proof of proposition 6
Ebert (1988) showed that for the whole class of welfare orderings R which could be represented




®i;nº(ui) with ®i;n ¸ ®i+1;n > 0;8i 2 N0 : i < n;
Pn
i=1 ®i;n = 1;
º an increasing concave transformation; n 2 N : n ¸ 3:






For any r > 0, G(r) belongs to the class considered by Ebert (1988). Indeed, let º be the identity





. Choosing the weighting vectors so that for wi;n = bn¡i, for
some b ¸ 1, and all n 2 N : n ¸ 3, yields the result (with c = (1 + r)b).
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